Dynamic resilient network games with applications to multiagent consensus

Yurid Nugraha, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Tomohisa Hayakawa*, Hideaki Ishii, Quanyan Zhu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)


A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges, whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. For this two-stage game, we characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to a multiagent consensus problem, where the game is played repeatedly over time. In this article, we study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process. Finally, we also provide numerical simulation to illustrate the results.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9167396
Pages (from-to)246-259
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2021
Externally publishedYes


  • Cyber security
  • energy constraints
  • game theory
  • jamming attacks
  • multiagent consensus


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