@inproceedings{e607560257b544c0983a7debdd7c5517,
title = "Two-Player Incomplete Games of Resilient Multiagent Systems",
abstract = "Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so.",
author = "Nugraha, {Yurid E.} and Tomohisa Hayakawa and Hideaki Ishii and Ahmet Cetinkaya and Quanyan Zhu",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2023 The Authors. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/); 22nd IFAC World Congress ; Conference date: 09-07-2023 Through 14-07-2023",
year = "2023",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ifacol.2023.10.1578",
language = "English",
series = "IFAC-PapersOnLine",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "2",
pages = "258--263",
editor = "Hideaki Ishii and Yoshio Ebihara and Jun-ichi Imura and Masaki Yamakita",
booktitle = "IFAC-PapersOnLine",
edition = "2",
}